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National Culture and Competitive Strategy
Disclosure in Global Airline Strategic Alliances
by Catherine Giapponi and Carl Scheraga
Corporate transparency, which involves financial, governance, and competitive strategy disclosure,
may have implications with respect to the development and effectiveness of alliance systems.
This study investigates the intensity of competitive strategy disclosure, which has received little
attention in the literature by the members of the three major airline alliances, Star, oneworld, and
SkyTeam. Through an examination of the corporate annual reports of each participant, the level of
strategy disclosure is assessed. Further, based on the seminal work of Gray (1988) that explored the
relationship between a country’s cultural profile and the level of disclosure by corporations in that
country, the study investigates the relationship between the intensity of disclosure and the cultural
identity of each of the airline alliance members.

INTRODUCTION
Strategic alliances have become an increasingly important part of the corporate strategic planning
process in the global airline industry. The 1990s witnessed the emergence of three global multicarrier alliances – Star, oneworld, and SkyTeam. These three alliances are comprised of airlines
spanning numerous national cultures and geographic regions. This study examines the existing
literature on competitive strategy disclosure. While governance and financial disclosure have
been intensively investigated, the same is not true with regard to disclosure of firms’ competitive
strategies. In this paper, this phenomenon is investigated within the context of the above mentioned
global airline strategic alliances. Drawing on existing literature, we provide a motivation for
suggesting that there is an important need for competitive strategy transparency in such alliances.
Additionally, previous empirical work suggests that national culture does indeed affect the level
of transparency in firms’ competitive strategy. Thus, this study does two things. It measures the
level of competitive strategy transparency within the three global airline alliances. Additionally,
it empirically investigates whether, in the context of these alliances, national culture significantly
affects the level of competitive strategy transparency. In fact, this study does find a statistically
significant relationship in this regard. If, as noted below, global airline strategic alliances have yet
to move beyond the initial phase of development, this empirical result highlights a managerial issue
that will be of continuing importance with regard to the growth and success of these alliances.
Michael Porter in his work The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990, 66-67) ominously
notes that “alliances are frequently transitional devices.” They may often be a temporary managerial
reaction in industries undergoing structural change or escalating competition. Doganis (2001) has
argued that there are three phases to building strategic alliances in the global airline industry, such
that, these partnerships achieve a sense of long-term commitment on the part of alliance participants.
The first of these phases is primarily oriented toward generating additional revenues through the
mechanisms of network expansion and joint marketing. The second phase is focused on cost savings.
This may entail separate agreements between strategic alliance partners in specific areas where joint
operations can reduce costs. The final or third phase is characterized by the partners commingling
their assets and using them jointly. There will be the movement away from separate brand identities
to the emphasis and adoption of a single alliance brand.
A Boston Consulting Group study by Cools and Roos (2005) suggests that global airline
strategic alliances have not moved beyond the first of the phases described by Doganis (2001).
The study notes that alliances in this industry developed as a strategic alternative to merger and
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acquisition strategies that were prohibited by regulatory and cultural barriers. Excess capacity and
poor economic performance moved the airline industry to pursue strategic alliances that would
provide opportunities similar to those associated with consolidation, including: operational
synergies, the reduction of costs, improved asset utilization, and platforms for future growth. Airline
alliances have provided consumers with benefits that include improved connectivity and increased
flight frequency, as well as the consolidation of frequent flyer programs. Cools and Roos (2005, 18)
go on to emphasize, however, that the extra revenue that has resulted from these consumer benefits
has been almost fully realized or “harvested.” It is noted that the alliances have not been as effective
in achieving difficult cost synergies. The study identifies four barriers that inhibit the facilitation of
more extensive synergies. One impediment is an asymmetry of benefits that accrue to the airlines
that make the initial investments necessary to generate the cost synergies. Perceived inequity in
financial return on such investments will reduce an alliance partner’s willingness to invest in such
programs. In addition, not all alliance members will have the necessary competencies to realize the
full benefits. The irreversibility of investments necessary for a commitment to an alliance is another
barrier noted in the study. A third barrier is the perception that a significant engagement in a strategic
alliance erodes future potential options, both financial and managerial, as it reduces the partner’s
ability to pursue alternative opportunities. Finally, cumbersome decision-making and alliance
governance issues complicate the development of more extensive operational relationships. To this
latter point, often every airline in an alliance has an equal vote, regardless of size or importance.
Thus, operational consolidations have typically been bilateral in nature, involving only two members
of an alliance, rather than all members.
Doganis (2001) suggests that for global airline strategic alliances to move from phase one to
phase three, there must be a sharing of long-term vision and objectives by all the alliance partners.
The vision and objectives of an alliance must be communicated to and understood by each level
of personnel in the participant airlines. Additionally, clear, neutral but strong strategic alliance
governance must be in place.
Given the importance of a shared understanding of vision and objectives, strategic transparency,
as influenced by national culture, is an important factor to consider in the identification of barriers
that inhibit the evolution of airline alliance systems beyond phase one. This study examines the
issue of strategic transparency and disclosure in the context of the three major global strategic
alliances in the airline industry. As noted above, while these alliances have been successful in
achieving incremental revenue enhancements, they have been less so with regard to the achievement
of economic synergies. Santema and van Oijen (2005, 354) define strategy disclosure as “…the
revelation of information an organization decides to share with its stakeholders on the strategy
it is pursuing and going to pursue in the future.” The current study explores the extent of such
“revelation” or the intensity of competitive strategy disclosure by the members of the three major
global airline alliances. The framework used in this research for measuring the transparency in a
firm’s competitive strategy is an adaptation of a model developed by Santema and van Oijen (2005).
This framework rests on a foundation that allows for an understanding of the organizational drivers
of these economic synergies, specifically those associated with competitive strategy transparency.
Competitive strategy transparency is investigated by the examination of corporate annual reports.
The 2005 annual reports of all the members of the three major airline alliances – Star, oneworld, and
SkyTeam – are utilized. There is, as detailed below, analytical precedent for this approach.
As noted above, the three alliances are comprised of airlines that span numerous national
cultures. The seminal work by Gray (1988) and subsequent research has demonstrated a relationship
between a country’s cultural profile as measured by Hofstede’s (1980) dimensions and the level of
disclosure in the annual corporate reports of firms in that country. Thus, this study investigates not
only the level of competitive strategy transparency demonstrated by participants in each of the three
major airline alliances but the relationship between said transparency and the cultural identity of
each of the participants.
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COMPETITIVE STRATEGY DISCLOSURE
The focus of the theoretical and academic literature on transparency has been on the concept of
corporate transparency. The manner is which this concept has been defined in empirical studies is
typified by the framework of Bushman et al. (2004). This framework has five components: financial
disclosures, governance disclosures, accounting principles, timeliness of disclosures, and credibility
of disclosures. Financial disclosure includes information on business segment performance, R&D
and capital expenditures, accounting policies, and subsidiary operations. Governance disclosure
encompasses information on major shareholders, management, boards of directors, director and
officer remuneration, and director and officer shareholdings. Accounting principles relate to
information on consolidation and discretionary reserves or balance sheet accounts representing
temporary accumulations of earnings from the current year or recent past, while timeliness of
disclosures captures the frequency of reporting, the consolidation of interim reports, and the number
of disclosed items. The credibility of disclosures is the percentage of information audited by the Big
5 accounting firms in a country (Bushman et al. 2004).
Not surprisingly, this framework for defining corporate transparency is reflected in the
corporate governance indices that have been developed to measure transparency (see Doidge et al.
forthcoming). The Standard & Poor’s (S&P) governance transparency index includes variables drawn
from the three broad categories of ownership structure and investor rights, financial transparency
and information disclosure, and board and management structure and processes (Standard & Poors
2004). The governance ratings of Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) construct a composite
index from variables reflecting the seven categories of management discipline, transparency,
independence, accountability, responsibility, fairness, and social responsibility (Credit Lyonnais
Securities Asia 2001). Transparency is measured in a manner that is almost identical to the model
of Bushman et al. (2004) noted above. Finally, governance ratings constructed by the FTSE Group
and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) utilize criteria in the eight categories of board, audit,
charter/bylaws, anti-takeover provisions, executive and director compensation, qualitative factors,
ownership, and director education (Institutional Shareholder Services 2003). The CLSA ratings
cover emerging and newly-emerged countries. The S&P and ISS ratings cover both developed and
emerging countries.
Giapponi and Scheraga (2007) examined the issue of governance disclosure on the part of global
airlines in each of the three major alliances. They utilized an extended variable set that built upon
the original five variables utilized by Bushman et al. (2004) in their definition of the transparency
sub-category of governance disclosure. Because airline strategic alliances span an array of national
cultures which influence the development of such relationships, they also examined the impact of
national culture as a determinant of governance transparency. A significant finding of this study is
that national culture impacts corporate governance disclosure in the airline industry thus highlighting
the importance of understanding the role cultural factors play in corporate transparency as it impacts
the evolving relationships in the airline alliance networks.
Although governance and financial disclosure have been studied extensively, there appears to
be a dearth of empirical work that examines those aspects of corporate transparency that focus
specifically on the competitive strategy of the firm. A study by Meek et al. (1995) examined some
aspects of strategy disclosure as part of a larger research study of voluntary disclosure and was
limited to companies in U.S., U.K., and Continental Europe. More focused strategy disclosure
research was conducted by Santema and van de Rijt (2001), but the study involved only Dutch
companies. Santema and van Oijen (2005) extended the research of strategic transparency in their
examination of firms across multiple industries in five European countries. Unlike these studies,
which are limited in global reach, our research in the global airline industry affords the opportunity
to examine competitive strategic disclosure across a much larger number of countries and cultures.
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GLOBAL AIRLINE STRATEGIC ALLIANCES AND THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY
IN STRATEGY
Porter (1980) provides a comprehensive discussion of the elements of a competitive strategy. A
firm’s competitive strategy is articulated through two key elements. The first is the firm’s goals
which provide a broad definition of how it defines its basis for competing and its specific economic
and non-economic objectives. The second is the operating policies through which the firm seeks
to achieve these goals. In formulating its competitive strategy, a firm must consider its internal
strengths and weaknesses, broad macro environmental and industry specific opportunities and
threats, the personal values of the organization, and broader societal expectations.
The above discussion suggests a strong need for transparency in competitive strategies between
strategic alliance partners. It was noted above that Porter (1980) defined two key elements that
comprised a firm’s competitive strategy. The first was a clear articulation of a firm’s goals and
objectives. Specific to strategic alliances, Whipple and Frankel (2000) suggest that clear goals
and the ability to meet performance expectations are important factors influencing the success of
alliances relationships. Other important factors include trust, senior management support, and partner
compatibility (Whipple and Frankel 2000). It has been argued that different alliance partners may
have different views on trust and what it entails (Koza and Levin 1998; Whipple and Frankel 2000).
If mutual trust is best fostered when the structure of an alliance closely supports the intent of the
alliance, then alliances must be carefully planned and controlled so that trust and defined boundaries
are not violated (Spekman et al. 1998; Whippel and Frankel 2000). Critical to the formation of an
alliance is agreement on the expected contribution of each participant and the allocation of profits.
Such agreement is not always easily reached because every firm has its own unique objectives that
it wishes to achieve (Lewis 1990). It is important, therefore, that each alliance member has a clear
understanding of what it must invest in the strategic alliance and what the alliance member can
expect in return. Such understanding implies a need for strategic transparency.
The studies just noted generally focus on partner and relationship characteristics in strategic
alliances. A study by Saxton (1997) observes that similarity in organizational processes is desirable
for the promotion of cooperation in strategic alliances. Thus, the potential for a positive outcome
in a strategic alliance is enhanced by the reputation of alliance partners, the existence of a prior
relationship between partners, shared decision-making, and similarities between partners.
However, the need for transparency in strategic alliance partners’ competitive strategies also
arises from a somewhat more subtle set of empirically observed phenomena. The second key
element, as defined by Porter (1980), of a firm’s competitive strategy is the set of operating policies
through which goals are achieved. More specifically, Porter (1996) suggests that strategy is the
creation of a unique and valuable position involving a different set of activities from those pursued
by competitors. Furthermore, strategy requires that the firm create a fit between its various activities.
Fit is the unique way a firm’s activities interact and reinforce one another. Thus, in contrast to the
above literature, there is a complementary body of research that suggests that it is the differences in
the competitive strategies of strategic alliance partners that produce synergistic effects. Schneider
et al. (1997) suggest that differences with regard to competitive strategies enhance the ability of
cooperative agreements to adapt to changes in the environment. Schneider and Bowen (1995)
observe that differing perspectives on how to reach organizational goals may act to prevent the
development of strategic myopia and inflexibility. Indeed, in a study of 78 international cooperation
cases, van Oudenhoven and van der Zee (2002) found that with regard to corporate competitive
strategy, strategic dissimilarity rather than similarity was critical to cooperation success.
Thus, sets of both strategic similarities and differences give rise to the important need for
transparency in firms’ competitive strategies. Similarity with regard to certain processes is necessary
to build cooperation and trust-based relationships within strategic alliances. At the same time,
distinctive/different competencies and resources are necessary in order for strategic alliances to
build unique competitive advantages.
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STRATEGIC TRANSPARENCY AND NATIONAL CULTURE
As noted above, strategic transparency may have implications for alliance development and success.
However, in a global alliance system, national cultural differences could impact perceptions of
transparency and the willingness to disclose information. In examining cross-cultural differences,
Hofstede (1980, 1984) and Hofstede and Bond (1988) identified five dimensions of national culture:
individualism versus collectivism, power distance, masculinity versus femininity, uncertainty
avoidance, and short-term versus long-term orientation. The dimension of individualism versus
collectivism indicates the extent to which a society is a “loosely knit social framework” in which
people are “supposed to take care of themselves and their immediate families only,” instead of a
“tightly knit social framework” in which people distinguish between in-groups and out-groups and
expect their in-group to look after them in exchange for loyalty (Hofstede 1984, 83). The dimension
of power distance indicates the extent to which a society accepts the fact that “power in institutions
and organizations is distributed unequally” among individuals (Hofstede 1984, 83). The dimension
of masculinity versus femininity indicates the extent to which the dominant values in society tend
toward assertiveness and the acquisition of things, and away from concern for people and the
quality of life. The dimension of uncertainty avoidance indicates the extent to which a society feels
threatened by ambiguous situations and tries to avoid them by providing rules, believing in absolute
truths, and refusing to tolerate deviation from the rule. Finally, the dimension of a short-term versus
long- term orientation indicates the extent to which a society exhibits a pragmatic future-oriented
perspective rather than a conventional historic or short-term point of view (Adler 1997).
In his study of the relationship between cultural/societal values and the development of
accounting systems, attitudes toward financial management and disclosure, and the regulation
of the accounting profession, Gray (1988) developed a framework of analysis using Hofstede’s
cultural dimensions. He identified four accounting value dimensions that influence a nation’s
financial reporting practices: professionalism versus statutory control, uniformity versus flexibility,
conservatism versus optimism, and secrecy versus transparency. The fourth dimension, secrecy vs.
transparency, is of particular interest to this study which explores competitive strategy disclosure. As
defined by Gray (1988, 8), secrecy is a “preference for confidentiality and the restriction of disclosure
of information about the business only to those who are closely involved with its management and
financing as opposed to a more transparent, open and publicly accountable approach.” He goes
on to hypothesize that countries ranking higher in uncertainty avoidance and power distance will
rank higher in terms of secrecy. Gray (1988) indicates that high uncertainty avoidance implies a
preference for secrecy because of the need to restrict information disclosures in order to avoid
conflict and competition. He also argues that societies ranking high on power distance prefer
secrecy, or a lower level of disclosure, in order to preserve inequalities in power. Further, the lower
a country ranks in terms of individualism “the more likely it is to rank high in terms of secrecy”
(Gray 1988, 11). A collectivistic orientation, societies ranking lower in individualism, with a sense
of responsibility to insiders as opposed to those external to the firm, would also be consistent with
greater secrecy. With regard to masculinity, “more caring societies where more emphasis is given
to the quality of life, people, and the environment, will tend to be more open” and transparent with
regard to information (Gray 1988, 11). Therefore, societies with a masculine orientation would be
more secretive than feminine cultures.
Competitive strategy disclosure is the most voluntary of the corporate disclosure categories.
Therefore, the authors contend that cultural orientation, measured along Hofstede’s dimensions,
influences the level and intensity of strategy disclosure. National cultural differences have important
implications for strategy disclosure in the global airline industry and are important in the context of
alliance development.
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THE USE OF CORPORATE ANNUAL REPORTS TO MEASURE TRANSPARENCY
This research study uses corporate annual reports to assess the extent to which the members of the
three major airline alliances disclose information relative to their strategy. Annual reports have been
used extensively in research involving information disclosure (see Stanton and Stanton (2002) for an
overview of the research perspectives used in corporate annual report studies). They are a medium
through which companies communicate with their stakeholders and the public. However, corporate
annual reports are more than formal documents used to convey mandatory corporate reporting
requirements. As suggested by Hopwood (1996, 55), corporate annual reports construct a “particular
visibility and meaning” as opposed to “what was there.” Similarly, Hines (1988, 257) addresses the
notion of communicating and constructing reality in annual report financial accounting disclosure:
“We create a picture of an organization, or the ‘economy,’ whatever you like, and on the basis of that
picture (not some underlying ‘real’ reality of which no one is aware), people think and act. And by
responding to that picture of reality, they make it so; it becomes ‘real in its consequences.’ And what
is more, when people respond to that picture, and the consequences occur, they see it as proof of our
having correctly conveyed reality.”
The use of annual reports for studies related specifically to disclosure has been well documented.
Botosan (1997, 329) states that “although the annual report is only one means of corporate reporting,
it should serve as a good proxy for the level of voluntary disclosure provided by a firm across
all disclosure avenues.” Lang and Lundholm (1993) note that annual report disclosure levels are
positively correlated with the amount of disclosure provided via other media. Knutson (1992, 7)
states that “at the top of every analyst’s list (of financial reports used by analysts) is the annual
report to shareholders. It is the major reporting document and every other financial report is in some
respect subsidiary or supplementary to it.” Patel and Dallas (2002, 6) suggest that the use of annual
reports “facilitates analysis and comparison of companies around the globe.”

DATA COLLECTION
An analysis of the intensity of strategy disclosure was conducted through the examination of the
2005 corporate annual reports filed by the full members of the three major airline alliances, Star,
oneworld, and SkyTeam at that point in time. Two independent readers were utilized and their content
analysis compared to reconcile any discrepancies. The initial content analysis yielded over 90%
agreement between the readers. Any inconsistencies, as noted, were reconciled through discussion
and further review of the annual reports. The Star Alliance members examined in the study included
Air Canada, Air New Zealand, ANA, Austrian, LOT Polish Airlines, Lufthansa, SAS, Singapore
Airlines, South African Airlines, Swiss, TAP Portugal, Thai, United, U.S. Airways, and Varig. It
should be noted that annual reports for two members of the Star Alliance, Asiana and BMI, were
not available for 2005 or the prior year 2004. These companies were, therefore, excluded from the
research. The members of the oneworld Alliance included in the study consisted of Aer Lingus,
American Airlines, British Airways, Cathay Pacific, Finnair, Iberia, LAN, and Qantas. The SkyTeam
Alliance members studied included Aeroflot, Aero Mexico, Air France, Alitalia, Continental, Czech
Airlines, Delta, Korean Air, and Northwest Airlines. It should be noted that the 2005 annual reports
were not available for Varig and Swiss Air International. However, the authors had access to the
2004 annual reports and thus these were used in the analysis. The 32 airlines included in this study
are listed in Table 1, along with an indication of their respective alliance membership.
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Table 1: Airline Alliances Members
Airline
Aeroflot
Aer Lingus
Aeromexico
Air Canada
Air France
Air New Zealand
Alitalia
All Nippon Airways
American Airlines
Austrian Airlines
British Airways
Cathay Pacific Airways
Continental Airlines
Czech Airlines
Delta Airlines
Finnair
Iberia Airlines
Korean Airlines
LAN
LOT Airlines
Lufthansa
Northwest Airlines
Qantas Airways
Scandinavian Airlines
Singapore Airlines
South African Airways
Swiss International Airlines
TAP Air Portugal
Thai Airways
United Airlines
US Airways

Varig

Alliance

SkyTeam
oneworld
SkyTeam
Star
SkyTeam
Star
SkyTeam
Star
oneworld
Star
oneworld
oneworld
SkyTeam
SkyTeam
SkyTeam
oneworld
oneworld
SkyTeam
oneworld
Star
Star
SkyTeam
oneworld
Star
Star
Star
Star
Star
Star
Star
Star
Star

A template was developed to measure the degree of disclosure of competitive strategy by
airlines in each of the three global strategic alliances. This template, an adaptation of the Santema
and van Oijen (2005) model, included the following items:

1.

2.

Business Definition:
a. Describe the business of the corporation/airline.
b. Scope of the business: geographic (number and identification of destinations/locations),
customer markets, long haul/short haul, etc.
c. Address the question: Who do we serve and how do we serve them?
Goals (Qualitative) and Vision: For example “become a leading airline”; “become number
one in every market in which we fly”; “become the number one European carrier.”
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3. Objectives:
4.
5.
6.
7.

Describe what is to be accomplished and when - specification of quantifiable
objectives with target date for achievement.
Internal Strengths: Identification of strategically critical organizational assets (tangible or
intangible), core and distinctive competencies, core capabilities.
Internal Weaknesses: Identification of resource gaps, core deficiencies.
Opportunities: Identification of external factors/forces/trends (competitive, economic,
political/legal, social/cultural, technological) that pose opportunities.
Threats: Identification of external factors/forces/trends (competitive, economic, political/
legal, social/cultural, technological) that pose threats.

8. Strategic matching of internal strengths and weaknesses and external opportunities and
threats. Indicated how organizational strengths could be used to take advantage of external

opportunities and/or used to reduce the airline’s vulnerability to external threats. Indicated how
organizational weaknesses inhibit the airline’s ability to take advantage of opportunities and/or
increased its vulnerability to external threats and how such weaknesses could be overcome.
9. Corporate Level Strategy: Identification of the industries/businesses in which the company
is/should be involved; Discussion of the directional strategy with respect to growth (growth,
stability, retrenchment); Discussion of strategies to manage across units (synergies).
10. Business Level Strategies: How is/should the company compete? (Porter (1980): Low cost
position, differentiation, niche/focus).
11. Monitoring/Control/Benchmarking: Indication of efforts to monitor and benchmark
performance areas – identification of specific initiatives to collect data and measure
performance.
12. Examples of Realized Goals/Strategies: Concrete examples of the achievement of previous
year’s goals and objectives and the tactical strategies that contributed to goal achievement.
13. Examples of Projected Goals/Strategies: Concrete examples of strategies to achieve next
year’s goals and objectives – specific tactical strategies.
All of the narrative sections of the annual reports of each airline were read and assessed to
determine the relative level of disclosure for each of the 13 strategy items. The transparency of each
item was evaluated on a scale of no disclosure, minimum level of disclosure for the sample, average
level of disclosure for the sample, and above average level of disclosure for the sample. Numerical
scores of zero, one, two, and three were assigned accordingly. A total score was calculated across all
13 categories for each airline.
Table 2 displays Hofstede’s (1980) indices, scores attributable to each airline based on national
culture, for each of four dimensions: uncertainty avoidance (UA), power distance (PD), individualism
(IND), and masculinity (MAS). High values for each of these four indices would indicate a national
culture characterized by high uncertainty avoidance, high power distance, strong individualistic
qualities, and a strong masculine orientation. It should be noted that scores for the fifth dimension
of short-term versus long-term orientation were not available, as the original study by Hofstede
and Bond (1988) that examined this dimension provided scores for only a very small subset of the
airlines in this study.
The total strategy disclosure score for each airline is also displayed in Table 2. As previously
noted, 13 strategy categories were evaluated and rated with scores ranging from 0 to 3 based on the
degree of transparency. Therefore, the lowest possible strategy disclosure score for an airline is 0
and the highest score is 39. Scores above a 30 indicate significant competitive strategy disclosure
and transparency.
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Table 2: Disclosure and Cross-Cultural Factor Ratings*
Uncertainty Avoidance, Power Distance, Individualism, Masculinity
UA

PD

IND

MAS

DISCL.
SCORE

Aer Lingus
American Airlines
British Airways
Cathay Pacific Airways
Finnair
Iberia Airlines
LAN
Qantas Airways

35
46
35
29
59
86
86
51

28
40
35
68
33
57
63
36

70
91
89
25
63
51
23
90

68
62
66
57
26
42
28
61

16
24
34
17
28
27
23
30

Aeroflot
Aeromexico
Air France
Alitalia
Continental Airlines
Czech Airlines
Delta Airlines
Korean Airlines
Northwest Airlines

95
82
86
75
46

93
81
68
50
40
57
40
60
40

39
30

36
69
43
70
62
57
62
39
62

21
23
31
27
26
30
30
22
30

Air Canada
Air New Zealand
All Nippon Airways
Austrian Airlines
LOT Airlines
Lufthansa
Scandinavian Airlines
Singapore Airlines
South African Airways
Swiss International Airlines
TAP Air Portugal
Thai Airways
United Airlines
US Airways
Varig

48
49
92
70
93
65
34
8
49
58
104
64
46
46
76

39
22
54

80
79
46
55
60
67

Airline
ONEWORLD

SKYTEAM

STAR

74
46
85
46

11

68
35
27

74
49
34
63
64
40
40
69

71
76
91
58
91
18
91

71

20
65
68
27
20
91
91
38

52
58
95
79
64
66
9
48
63
70
31
34
62
62
49

26
36
28
37
23
34
32
18
25
27
24
22
25
29
11

* Hofstede (1980)
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RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
As seen in Table 2, there are differences between the airlines relative to the level of competitive
strategy disclosure. The disclosure scores ranged from a low of 11 (Varig) to a high of 37 (Austrian
Airlines). The median score for all of the airlines was 26.5. In terms of differences in the intensity of
competitive strategy disclosure between the alliances, alliance membership does not appear to have
an impact on the level of disclosure. The differences of the mean disclosure scores among alliances
were not statistically significant.
Within each alliance, individual airline disclosure scores differed and the importance of
national culture is apparent. The relationship between Hofstede’s cross-cultural factors (1980) and
competitive strategy disclosure was examined by dividing the sample into those airlines that were
above the median in competitive strategy disclosure (as measured by the total score) and those that
were below the median. A test of differences in means was done using the non-parametric Wilcoxon
test (see Table 3A). The software utilized is the NPAR1WAY procedure in SAS (2002). This test
was performed with and without the U.S. airlines. Annual reports of U.S. airlines include the Form
10K in addition to other material. Thus, these airlines were held out of the sample when the test was
performed a second time to test for any bias because of this difference in annual report format (See
Table 3B).

Table 3A: Non-parametric Test of Means (Wilcoxon) of Cross-Cultural Factors
Above Median versus Below Median Disclosure – Full Sample
Above Median
Below Median

UA
60.75
62.00

PD
39.94***
58.69***

IND
72.31**
49.25**

MAS

58.00
51.50

*** = Statistically significant at 1% level
** = Statistically significant at 5% level

Table 3B: Non-parametric Test of Means (Wilcoxon) of Cross-Cultural Factors
Above Median versus Below Median Disclosure – U.S. Airlines Excluded
Above Median
Below Median

UA
64.15
65.69

PD
39.92***
63.00***

IND
68.00***
39.62***

MAS

57.08
49.08

*** = Statistically significant at 1% level
The findings indicate that there is a correlation between national culture and strategy information
disclosure. The results displayed in Table 3A show that the intensity of competitive strategy disclosure
is negatively correlated with power distance, with statistical significance at a 1% level. Therefore,
airlines from societies that are more accepting of power inequalities disclosed less information
relative to organizational strategy. This supports Gray’s (1988) hypothesis that countries ranking
higher in power distance will rank higher in secrecy. Reporting in low power distance cultures
tends to be more comprehensive than in high power distance cultures (Hussein 1996). In this study,
Austrian Airlines, for example, had the lowest power distance rating in the sample and scored the
highest on level of strategy disclosure.
There is a positive correlation between the intensity of disclosure and individualism at a 5% level
of statistical significance. Airlines from countries that ranked higher in individualism ranked higher
in competitive strategy disclosure. The demand for accountability may be greater in individualist
societies and, therefore, the level of disclosure may be greater than that of collectivist societies
(Santema and van Oijen 2005). This finding also supports Gray’s hypothesis that countries ranking
lower in terms of individualism rank higher in terms of secrecy and, therefore, lower in disclosure.
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Societies favoring a collectivist orientation, by distinguishing between in-groups and out-groups,
reveal less information to external constituencies and the public. The relationship between strategy
disclosure and masculinity was not found to be statistically significant. Similarly, the relationship
between strategy disclosure and uncertainty avoidance was not statistically significant. In this case,
however, the findings indicate that the direction of the relationship supports Gray’s (1988) hypothesis
that countries ranking higher in uncertainty avoidance will rank higher in secrecy.
The results presented in Table 3B, which excludes the U.S. airlines whose annual reports
include the Form 10K, support the findings discussed above. The level of competitive strategy
disclosure is negatively correlated with power distance, with statistical significance at a 1% level.
The positive correlation between the intensity of disclosure and individualism actually improved to
a 1% level when the U.S. airlines were excluded. As in Table 3A, the relationships between strategy
disclosure and masculinity and strategy disclosure and uncertainty avoidance were not found to
be statistically significant. Again, the direction of the relationship between strategy disclosure and
uncertainty avoidance supports Gray’s (1988) hypothesis. It should be noted that the differences in
cross-cultural factor ratings between the three airline alliances were not statistically significant.
Table 4 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for the disclosure score variable and each
of Hofstede’s four cultural dimension variables. The statistically significant correlations between the
disclosure score variables and those for power distance and individualism are consistent with the
results in Table 3A and Table 3B. However, there is also information in Table 4 which yields an even
richer story as to how the four dimension variables interact and reinforce each other. In addition
to ranking national cultures along the four dimensions of uncertainty avoidance, power distance,
individualism, and masculinity, Hofstede (1991) also considered pairings of these dimensions to
further describe particular countries, based on the pair-wise inter-correlations between the four
dimension variables. He found that nations like Thailand, Korea, Singapore, Chile, Portugal,
Japan, Brazil, Hong Kong, and Mexico were characterized as large power distance - collectivist.
These are the home countries of Thai Airways, Korean Airlines, Singapore Airlines, LAN, Tap Air
Portugal, All Nippon Airways, Varig, Cathay Pacific Airways, and Aeromexico, which is reflected
in the statistically significant negative correlation (-0.67 in Table 4) between power distance and
individualism in this study’s sample.
Nations like South Africa, Austria, Germany, Switzerland, Ireland, France, Italy, Canada,
New Zealand, Australia, Great Britain, and the United States were characterized as individualist masculine. These are the home countries of South African Airways, Austrian Airlines, Lufthansa,
Swiss International Airlines, Aer Lingus, Air France, Alitalia, Air Canada, Air New Zealand, Qantas
Airways, British Airways, American Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Airlines, Northwest
Airlines, United Airlines, and US Airways, which is reflected in the statistically significant positive
correlation (0.35 in Table 4) between individualism and masculinity in this study’s sample.
Nations like Korea, Thailand, Chile, Mexico, Portugal, Brazil, Spain, and Japan were
characterized as strong uncertainty avoidance - collectivist. These are the home countries of Korean
Airlines, Thai Airways, LAN, Aeromexico, Tap Air Portugal, Varig, Iberia Airlines, and All Nippon
Airways, which is reflected in the statistically significant negative correlation (-0.39 in Table 4)
between uncertainty avoidance and individualism in this study’s sample.
Finally, nations like Thailand, Italy, Brazil, Chile, Korea, Mexico, Spain, France, Japan, and
Portugal were characterized as large power distance - strong uncertainty avoidance. These are the
home countries of Thai Airways, Alitalia, Varig, Korean Airlines, Aeromexico, Iberia Airlines, Air
France, All Nippon Airways, and TAP Air Portugal, which is reflected in the statistically significant
positive correlation (0.45 in Table 4) between power distance and uncertainty avoidance in this
study’s sample.
The correlation between masculinity and uncertainty avoidance and masculinity and power
distance were not found to be statistically significant in this sample.
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Table 4: Pearson Correlation Coefficients / Hofstede’s Dimensions and Disclosure Score

Prob > |r| under H0: Rho = 0
DSCORE
UA

DSCORE
1.00000

UA
-0.02125
1.00000

PD
IND
MAS

PD
-0.61832
***
0.44755
***
1.00000

IND
0.53665
***
-0.39406
**
-0.66625
***
1.00000

MAS
0.17556
-0.08344
-0.25145
0.34701
**
1.00000

*** = Statistically significant at 1% level
** = Statistically significant at 5% level
The relationship between these dimensional pairings or subgroups and the level of competitive
strategy disclosure was examined using the Tukey-Kramer method (Tukey 1953, Kramer 1956). In
this case, testing differences in the means was complicated by the fact that the sub-samples were of
unequal size. The original Tukey test (1952) was designed specifically for pair wise comparisons
based on the studentized range ratio (see formula below) and controls the maximum experimentwise error rate (MEER) when the sample sizes are equal. The sample sizes in this study were not
equal and, therefore, the unequal cell sizes required that an extension of the test proposed by Tukey
(1952, 1953) be used. Tukey (1953) and Kramer (1956) independently proposed a modification for
unequal cell sizes and it is the Tukey-Kramer method that was used in this study. Hayter (1984)
provided proof that the Tukey-Kramer procedure controls the MEER and it has also fared well in
Monte Carlo studies (Dunnett 1980).
Specifically, for two groups yi and yj, with ni and nj observations in each group respectively and s
being the root mean square error based on ν degrees of freedom, their means and are considered
significantly different by the Tukey-Kramer criterion if:
(1)
where q(;κ,ν) is the α-level critical value of a studentized range distribution of κ independent
normal random variables with ν degrees of freedom. The software utilized is the GLM (General
Linear Model) procedure in SAS (2002), which calculates significance for the Tukey-Kramer
statistic at the 5% level.
As can be seen in Table 5, airlines whose national culture was classified as either large power
distance - collectivist or uncertainty avoidance - collectivist had disclosure scores which, on average,
were statistically significantly less than those of the other airlines in the sample. Airlines whose
national culture was classified as individualist - masculine had disclosure scores, which on average,
were statistically significantly greater than those of the other airlines in the sample. No statistically
significant difference was found for airlines whose national culture was classified as power distance
- strong uncertainty avoidance and the other airlines in the sample.
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Table 5: Non-Parametric Test of Means (Tukey-Kramer)
Disclosure Differences by Large Power Distance - Collectivist, Individualist Masculine, Uncertainty Avoidance - Collectivist, Power Distance - Strong
Uncertainty Avoidance Subgroups
Large Power Distance - Collectivist (n = 9)
Others (n = 23)

Disclosure Score
20.89**
28.17**

Individualist – Masculine (n = 17)
Others (n = 15)

Disclosure Score
28.65**
23.27**

Uncertainty Avoidance – Collectivist (n = 8)
Others (n = 24)

Disclosure Score
22.50**
27.33**

Power Distance - Strong Uncertainty Avoidance (n = 9)
Others (n = 23)

Disclosure Score
23.89
27.00

** = Statistically significant at 5% level

CONCLUSION
The results of the study indicate that there is a discernable and significant relationship between
national culture and the intensity of corporate strategy disclosure in the airline industry. As compared
to financial and governance information, competitive strategy disclosure is the most voluntary
with little in the way of common disclosure standards. National values and cultural differences,
therefore, may have a more profound impact on the disclosure of strategy information. The practical
implications for managers in the airline industry include the recognition that members of the same
alliance may not view the need to disclose information from the same cultural lenses and, therefore,
voluntary disclosure will vary across companies. Further, the results of the study suggest that
membership in an alliance does not guarantee commonality in the level of information sharing,
specifically strategic information.
As noted earlier, it has been observed that the global airline strategic alliances have not
moved beyond the initial phase, as described by Doganis (2001), that is oriented toward revenue
generation through network expansion and joint marketing (Cools and Roos 2005). National
cultural differences as they relate to information disclosure may play a role in inhibiting the progress
toward the subsequent phases. The potential benefits and synergies that can be achieved through
the alliance systems may be more readily apparent and realized with increased competitive strategy
transparency.
Future studies that examine the relationship between corporate transparency and alliance
membership stability, relationship development, and economic benefits/success may provide
greater insight into alliance development barriers. Longitudinal studies focusing on the intensity of
information disclosure and the success of alliance systems over time may provide airline managers
with practical insight into the implications of information asymmetry on the long-term effectiveness
of alliance relationships. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Varig, whose disclosure score of
11 was the lowest in the sample, has subsequently left the Star Alliance. In addition, future studies
that integrate multiple dimensions of information disclosure including financial, governance, and
strategic information, may provide a more complete understanding of differences in corporate
transparency within and among the airline alliances.
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